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If one is to believe the reports of the 
international media, Pakistan is the most 
dangerous place in the world. An evaluation 
which seems to be increasingly en vogue 
during the last years with publications titled 
‚Descent into Chaos’, ‘Frontline Pakistan’, 
‘Armageddon in Pakistan’, ‘Pakistan’s 
Lawless Frontier’, ‘Pakistan: A Hard 
Country’, ‘Breakdown in Pakistan’ etc. But 
such platitudes only partly help to 
understand the complexity of the multi-
layered challenges which Pakistan has to 
face. However, one has to admit that all 
these publications point at one significant 
phenomenon which cannot be denied: 
Pakistan contends with serious problems 
that go far beyond a negative image.  
In this context, one has to state that in 
recent years due to the ‘direct and 
immediate concerns’ the current 
international attention and awareness was 
mostly centred around Pakistan’s links with 
terrorism, especially it’s cross-border facets. 
There was a certain understanding that 
Pakistan is characterized by an unrestricted 
struggle between ineffective political parties, 
a weak civil society, and inefficient civilian 
institutions – an imposition of a central 
governance system which undermines any 
effective federally structured state 
organization, and extremely unhealthy civil-
military relations which finds its expression 
in the absence of civilian supremacy.  
But the matrix of implications and 
causalities of terrorism, militancy, religious 
extremism and the unfavourable socio-
economic conditions, especially regarding 
the quality of democracy and the state of 
the civil society, were either ignored or not 
taken into account adequately. 
However, there were many promises and 
hopes in the 2013 election year in Pakistan. 
The first democratic transfer of power from 
one elected civilian government to another 
was largely celebrated as an event which 
could determine the critical juncture in order 
to change unfortunate traditional patterns in 
Pakistani politics. Or in other words, the 
elections were interpreted as a most crucial 
step towards a democratic transition. 
Undoubtedly, the 2013 general elections 
were a milestone in the country’s chequered 
political history. The Pakistani people 
witnessed several coups d’états, military 
dictatorships, elected governments with 
strong authoritarian tendencies, or military 
controlled civilian regimes. But never have 
the Pakistani people ever experienced the 
regular ending of the tenure of a civilian 
administration which subsequently led to 
free and fair elections without any 
derailment or disturbances that have been 
induced by Pakistan’s omnipresent security 
apparatus. 
There was much talk among the observers 
during the election process about several 
positive signs that indicate that the country 
is finally making its transition towards 
democracy. Statements by the military top 
brass to stay out of politics, the country’s 
successful first steps in coalition politics, 
more professionalism within the political 
parties, the passing of several major bills 
through the national parliament, significant 
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constitutional amendments, the way in 
which demands for an extra-judicial 
technocratic caretaker government were 
ruled out, and finally the political rise of 
Imran Khan who was portrayed as someone 
deemed to be fit for preventing the 
downward spiral of the nation were seen as 
clear indications that the country was finally 
ready to join the league of democratic 
countries. 
But by observing the democratic 
enthusiasm in 2013 one must wonder if this 
evaluation really matches the reality on the 
ground in Pakistan. One of the major 
puzzles is: to what extent are the 
statements made during the campaign of 
the victorious politicians and their respective 
political parties implemented in concrete 
political decisions? Or was 2013 just 
another short episode of wishful thinking?  
The domestic political situation in 2014 still 
looks rather grim. Pakistan’s socio-
economic and political problems are 
mounting and it seems that Nawaz Sharif’s 
government is not making much progress in 
any crucial field. The problems that Pakistan 
faces include rampant terrorism, multiple 
insurgencies, tremendous ethno-religious 
conflicts, an economy in free fall, the lack of 
electricity and a debilitating foreign policy. 
Being confronted with such extraordinary 
challenges can we still talk about a new 
positive era in Pakistan politics? 
In order to do so, one should focus on 
analysing whether Pakistan is in a transition 
from authoritarian-technocratic rule towards 
the beginning of a linear process of 
stabilization and consolidation of its 
democracy. Therefore, it is most important 
to assess the performance of the new 
government under Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif, which has now been in office close 
to one year since the elections.  
 
The first thing that catches the attention is 
how Nawaz Sharif has changed his 
personal leadership style, his way of making 
politics and to run the state of governmental 
affairs. This is gaining significance if one 
takes the trajectories of his first two tenures 
during the 1990ties into account. In his first 
two tenures (1990-1993 and 1997-1999), 
the civilian governments under Nawaz 
Sharif had the opportunity to consolidate 
their effective power to govern and to 
improve the quality, effectiveness, and 
ethos of the political and administrative 
institutions in Pakistan. Of high importance 
is that civilians at that point had the 
opportunity to establish institutionalized 
civilian control. Especially during Sharif’s 
second tenure he entrusted with substantive 
power. Being endowed with a two-third 
majority in the parliament Sharif 
immediately repealed the 8th amendment, 
which was identified as the military’s ‘Trojan 
horse’ within Pakistan’s constitutional 
framework to exercise political power via 
the President. Furthermore, to reduce the 
option for the military to weaken his 
parliamentary position, he passed the 14th 
amendment (in 1997) taking away the rights 
of the members of the assemblies to vote 
with whichever political party they wanted 
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(anti-defection or horse-trading). It 
appeared that Sharif changed the political 
structures favouring an army-backed 
president and disadvantaged the civilian 
government. The fact that the Prime 
Minister was able to remove a President, a 
Chief Justice and a COAS seemed to 
indicate this and marked a significant power 
shift within Pakistan’s civil-military relations. 
But the fact that Sharif replaced these three 
positions with Sharif’s own favourites 
provoked much criticism, and only 
emphasised  the increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies of his government. Due to his 
consequent unrestricted and unscrupulous 
search for absolute power, he weakened 
existing political institutions, especially the 
judiciary. Sharif, with his narrowly-based 
and personalized decision-making style, 
alienated most of his civilian allies in the 
provinces, leading to regional political 
destabilization and violent conflicts. Both 
made his government more dependent on 
support from the armed forces which 
subsequently gained more political 
influence.  
 
Today it looks more and more like a déjà vu 
of the 1990s. Whenever he has the chance, 
Sharif turns back to his style of governance 
which is determined by the following 
features:  
First, Sharif’s leadership is characterized by 
an extraordinarily high degree of 
personalization with a strong focus on a few 
selected and loyal persons. It seems that 
Sharif has an interest in running 
government affairs as if it were a family 
business. Nepotism in the current 
administration seems more widespread 
than in the 1990s. 
 
Second, absolute centralization of power in 
the Prime Minister’s office, more concrete 
under direct control of the prime minister. 
The most prominent example is that Nawaz 
keeps the Punjab (Pakistan’s most powerful 
province), with the help of his brother 
Shahba,- under his tight control. 
Furthermore, Shahbaz also has a strong 
grip on key federal state authorities and as 
such is helping his brother to micromanage 
most of the significant ministries. In this 
context, it should also be mentioned that 
Nawaz Sharif directly acquired four key 
ministries: defence, foreign affairs, 
communications and law. This must be 
seen as an indication that Sharif does not 
believe in any broader power sharing 
model. However, one cannot help feeling 
but investing so less in thrust into his 
cabinet colleagues and insisting in taking on 
personally most of the major responsibilities 
instead of delegating them, must be 
interpreted either as a lack of managerial 
skills or as a symptom of hubris.   
 
Third, disempowering the cabinet. There is 
no doubt that Sharif’s preference for 
monopolizing power happens at the 
expense of all other political institutions, 
foremost the cabinet. Instead of including 
the elected representatives of the people 
(civilians), Sharif relies on the bureaucrats 
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in running the ministerial affairs. As such, he 
continues the process of undermining the 
internalization of democratic procedures, 
norms, and values within the country’s 
political-administrative institutional 
framework. In practice, this means that 
Sharif does not use the cabinet to exercise 
power. It seems that decision-making is 
done in other forums outside the given 
institutional structure and processes 
provided by Pakistan’s constitution.  
 
Fourth, Nawaz Sharif has the strong 
tendency of side lining the parliament. In 
theory Pakistan’s constitution prepares for a 
parliamentary democracy. But until today 
parliamentarianism is not really a success 
story in the country. This is only partly 
because of the persistent military 
intervention into the political process. It is 
also a ‘home-grown’ problem within the 
sphere of (elected) civilians. Even a 
minimum level of efficiency of the lower 
house was for a long time not possible due 
of the absence of a constructive working 
relationship between the government and 
opposition as well as the subsequent extra-
parliamentary activities like ‘street politics’, 
and/or disinterests of parliamentarians in 
many policy fields. But there were more 
unfortunate phenomena encroaching on the 
legislative sphere. Parliamentary work was 
significantly limited by an overactive 
judiciary which has frequently encroached 
on legislative prerogatives, foremost in 
constitutional matters. Additionally, the 
parliament was permanently hampered by 
the executive (civilian and military), which 
has dominated the political agenda and the 
decision making processes. In 
consequence, most of the time the 
legislative was turned into a ‘rubber stamp’ 
body during the last decades. In other 
words, the activities of the parliament were 
more a matter of formality than of any 
substantial contribution to the political 
process. In this context, one must state that 
Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s contributed 
much to these negative factors avoiding the 
development of a functional legislative 
branch of Pakistan’s political system. Today, 
the Prime Minister is apparently just 
continuing the traditional strategy of 
ignoring the parliament. He doesn’t dare to 
attend the sessions of the parliament on a 
regular basis. Being reluctant to strengthen 
the role of the parliament in the political 
decision making, it is no surprise that also 
the cabinet, which is accountable to the 
parliament, follows the path of the Prime 
Minister by not taking the parliament as a 
place for political debate and decision-
making seriously. Being deliberately 
downgraded into a body for briefing and 
ratification as well as to take on formal 
political ownership, the cabinet does not 
have many interests in parliamentary 
proceedings. 
 
In sum, instead of establishing new rules of 
the game in order to make Pakistan more 
governable, ordered and peaceful, Nawaz 
Sharif is again following the patterns of 
politics that are responsible for the country’s 
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overall bad governance. The latter is 
primarily a result of the Prime Minister’s 
personal style of leadership. The impact of it 
on Pakistan’s political landscape can be 
seen in the poor performance outcomes of 
his policies.   
 
Taking into account the traditionally tensed 
relations between politicians and soldiers in 
general and the Prime Minister’s own 
troubled history with the army in particular, 
one should shed some light on the current 
state of affairs in the country’s civil-military 
relations first. By and large it can be states 
that there is no visible improvement of civil-
military relations towards the establishment 
of civilian control. The fact that the army did 
not intervene in the 2013 election process 
does not mean that they accept the 
supremacy of civilian governance. Rather, it 
seems that the army top brass maintains its 
control behind the scene and continues to 
dominate all relevant fields as well as to 
protect their corporate interests. Here, it 
seems Sharif is not willing or able to 
challenge the leverage of the soldiers within 
the country’s economy. This is significant, 
since one of the major problems of all 
governments and the top reasoning for the 
poor performance, is the lack of funds. With 
view on the tremendous defence budget 
there is not much room to manoeuver within 
the most fields of public policy. The fact that 
the combined losses of the largest state-
sector enterprises (for example Pakistan 
Steel Mills, Pakistan International Airlines 
(PIA), or Pakistan Railways) and the energy 
sector is more or less equal with the entire 
defence budget, showcases the urgency of 
the situation. But instead of cutting down 
the defence budget, the federal government 
has broadened the tax net and looks for 
further loans from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 
Nevertheless, the defence budget remains 
untouched which underpins the high 
leverage of the military over Pakistan’s 
finance policy. Also in other areas, it does 
not look like that Nawaz Sharif made any 
remarkable progress in gaining influence: 
Neither regarding the relations towards 
India and Afghanistan, nor internal security. 
The uncertainties regarding the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Afghanistan, cross-
border terrorism and militancy in the tribal 
areas, a potential Hindu-Nationalist 
government in India, and an Afghanistan in 
transition after the period of Harmid Karzai 
presidency indicate that the soldiers will 
maintain their taps on these policy fields.  
 
However, in the context of domestic affairs, 
there are no doubts that the security 
situation is worsening rapidly, especially in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and 
urban centres such as Karachi. The 
increasing Taliban activities, in quantitative 
and qualitative terms, and growing violence 
against the country’s ethnic and religious 
minorities are some of the most dramatic 
examples of this trend. Nawaz Sharif seems 
to have chosen accommodation and 
reconciliation towards the perpetrators of 
the past and ongoing atrocities as his 
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priorities. However, this approach only 
works when all actors involved have the 
political will to function as stakeholders in 
state and society in order to work towards 
better governance and democratic 
consolidation. Here, Sharif was at least able 
to forge political arrangements with Imran 
Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf to set up a 
provincial government in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) as well as with political 
forces in Balochistan to keep the region 
relatively calm. But in the case of dealing 
with the Taliban, Sharif’s ‘reconciliation 
mantra’ turns out into a disaster because of 
two simple reasons. First, the Prime 
Minister did not have any comprehensive 
strategy to deal with the Taliban and 
affiliated terrorists. Second, the Taliban as 
anti-systemic forces are not interested at all 
in any peace arrangements with any non-
Islamic fundamentalist or democratic 
governments. Nevertheless, Sharif seems 
reluctant to accept that the Taliban are 
neither amenable for peace nor willing to 
compromise on their radical ideology and 
deeply held beliefs. Political 
accommodation and consensus politics are 
alien concepts to them. The Taliban 
consider democratic processes as a threat 
that can weaken the power and efficiency of 
the ideology that holds their movement 
together. Democratic contestation would 
deteriorate the Taliban movement’s 
coherence and give room for fragmentation. 
Hence, it is in the nature and a matter of 
survival for the Taliban to fight democracy. 
Subsequently, militant Islamic 
fundamentalism and development can’t go 
hand-in-hand. As long as the Sharif is still 
undecided either to fight or to appease 
militants and religious fanatics, Pakistan will 
be far away from having peace and stability. 
The Nawaz administration should also be 
aware that the withdrawal of foreign troops 
from the region will not bring about any 
change in this direction. In result, foreign 
donors and investors are not willing to 
increase their engagement in the country.  
 
Basically, besides achieving the GSP+ 
(Generalized System of Preferences)  
status with the EU (which grants Pakistan 
certain trade benefits) no major 
enhancement regarding the miserable 
economic indicators were achieved. 
Furthermore, the GSP+ benefits are 
accompanied by obligations and 
responsibilities, especially towards good 
governance and human rights. Indeed, the 
Pakistani government signed the necessary 
international conventions which are 
essential for obtaining the GSP+ status. But 
the more important puzzle remains 
untouched: will Islamabad commit to these 
conventions by incorporating them into 
national law? Here, the government was not 
able to deliver any remarkable outcome, 
especially not towards ending or at least 
containing sectarian violence or militancy 
towards the country’s religious and ethnic 
minorities. Also regarding labour rights or 
environmental protections no initiatives 
were started indicating a sustainable 
betterment of traditionally disadvantages 
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regions and communities. If Islamabad does 
not comply with these key human rights and 
labour conventions, it might lose the GSP+ 
benefits. The EU created a precedent in this 
case by temporarily revoking Sri Lanka’s 
trade benefits after Colombo failed to 
commit to these treaties. Losing GSP+ 
marks an uncalculated risk to the political 
reputation of the ‘Sharif administration’, not 
only at the national level but also in Punjab. 
As a result, it would be a tremendous, 
additional challenge towards the stability of 
the government. Islamabad is not only 
under stress because of the Taliban, but 
also because of the unpredictable and 
severe power load shedding. Here, beyond 
GSP+, Sharif was able to get some 
homework regarding the energy crisis done, 
but still it remains insufficient to function as 
a significant boost for the country’s 
deteriorating economic conditions. The 
country’s economy continues to suffer from 
slow human development, endemic 
corruption, a weak administrative-
institutional framework, a lack of 
professionalism among its bureaucracy, 
tremendous budget deficits, draining foreign 
exchange reserves, and a political will 
unwilling to carry out necessary major 
structural reforms (especially those which 
would limit benefits and other prerogatives 
of their own profession).  
 
To sum up, Pakistan’s problems run broad 
and deep, and an approach that expects to 
solve the myriad issues tackling the 
underlying consequences as well as the 
causes is most likely for many observers 
only a wishful thinking. The quality of law 
and order as well as the country’s capacities 
for progress appears at a pathetic level. 
However, remaining in the old traditional 
patterns of ‘muddling through’ for political 
survival is obviously no option anymore for 
the political establishment, especially not for 
Nawaz Sharif if he wants to finish his 
tenure. Far reaching reforms in all 
governmental spheres as well as a national 
consensus on how to deal with the most 
crucial, pressing challenges are needed. 
However, after assessing close to one year 
of Nawaz Sharif’s third attempt to run the 
country one can’t help but feeling that it 
does not look like he learned many lessons 
from his previous time in office. Rather, it 
seems that old habits die hard, 
unfortunately for Pakistan and its people. 
 
